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Abstract
Background: The current law on anonymization sets the same standard across all situations, which poses a problem for biomedical
research.
Objective: We propose a matrix for setting different standards, which is responsive to context and public expectations.
Methods: The law and ethics applicable to anonymization were reviewed in a scoping study. Social science on public attitudes
and research on technical methods of anonymization were applied to formulate a matrix.
Results: The matrix adjusts anonymization standards according to the sensitivity of the data and the safety of the place, people,
and projects involved.
Conclusions: The matrix offers a tool with context-specific standards for anonymization in data research.
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Introduction
The Promise of Big Data Research
The era of big data, which is rendered possible by high-power
computing and increasingly cheap data storage, offers
possibilities for research that have broad and lasting impact. In
the last decade, the cost of memory has dropped from dollars
per gigabyte to cents per gigabyte [1]. In 2013, the entire amount
of data storage globally was 4.4 zettabytes (1021bytes), but in
Utah, the National Security Agency facility’s storage capacity
alone is now estimated at over 1 yottabyte (1024bytes). Traffic
on the internet has now surpassed 1 zettabyte per year [2]. The
use of data has the potential to transform many fields with health
care as a leading prospect [3,4]. Vast amounts of health care
data are already gathered, although not always in an electronic
form. The widespread adoption of smartphone apps and
wearables will vastly increase the amount of wellness and health
data produced. Big data and databank research qualitatively
differs from most other forms of health care research. Health
data already collected for other purposes is often repurposed as
a secondary use. This involves considerable cost savings but
introduces the problem of lack of participant consent for
research. Such issues are particularly acute with health care and
other sensitive data. The potential is enormous, but the benefits
are not fully exploited because of issues with consent, even
though the research involves minimal risk to participants in
most cases [5].
Consent, Privacy, and Inconsistent Standards
Minimal risks, however, do not justify a cavalier approach to
public consultation or consent requirements, as the failure of
United Kingdom (UK) Care.data project demonstrated [6,7].
Failure to consult or inform the public properly resulted in the
program being shelved despite having a firm statutory basis to
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proceed (although the relevant legislation may be incompatible
with the General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR [8]).
Several commentators have stated that the “consent or
anonymize” model does not work for big data [5,9,10]. These
issues have led to inconsistent decision making by governance
bodies, which have the potential to hinder research in this rapidly
progressing area. This paper justifies an anonymization matrix
to guide decision making by research ethics review bodies. It
draws on relevant norms in the European Union (EU) but will
be applicable in other milieux.
Different standards for data research governance in different
jurisdictions cause multinational projects certain issues, which
have been addressed in the literature. There is also strong
anecdotal evidence for inconsistency in approach among
research governance bodies within the same jurisdiction.
Reasons for such differences need exploration to ascertain
whether the consistency and quality of decision making could
be improved. Also pertinent is the consideration of public
attitudes to inform decision making by research governance
bodies.
Methods
Overview
A scoping study was performed using a recognized 5-step
methodology to examine the regulation of data science in North
America and the EU [11]. These jurisdictions were chosen
because of their cultural connections and ease of access to
literature because there were no resources to examine or translate
publications in languages other than English. The major relevant
statutes are GDPR (EU) and the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA; USA). GDPR provides
derogations for conduct of research without consent, and these
are much narrower in scope for health care and other sensitive
data. The EU definition of anonymization is based on the
possibility of reidentification using techniques that are “likely
reasonably” to be used and without using of additional
information (which may be easy to obtain). HIPAA provides a
framework for anonymization that is far more prescriptive. The
research question for the scoping study was as follows: what
research on ethics of data anonymization exists to address public
expectations of data management by researchers?
Studies were identified using an electronic search using Google
Scholar, Westlaw, PubMed, and citation tracking and by manual
search. Titles were selected after examination of abstracts. Data
were charted from the small number of relevant studies selected
with a narrative review generated from these papers. Results
were collated and summarized and are presented in the analysis
that forms this paper’s main text. This analysis and its
subsequent conclusions have informed the construction of the
proposed anonymization matrix.
Health Care Data Research: What Are the Issues?
Consent
Health data research presents particular ethical issues. Large
numbers of participants are exposed to minimal risks with a
large number of projects possible using the same resource.
Research tissue banks raise similar matters, and there is a
considerable crossover with databank research because tissue
banks usually have patient data in conjunction with tissue
samples; for example, the UK Biobank project has
approximately 500,000 participants and each participant, in
addition to providing blood, saliva, and urine samples, completes
an extensive lifestyle questionnaire [12]. Their imaging study
aims to enroll 100,000 participants [13]. These resources are
established for future research, the nature of which cannot be
predicted [14,15]. The biobank is the curator of the resource
rather than the body that performs research. A large number of
participants and potential projects would make obtaining specific
consent in each case a massive administrative burden and would
inevitably reduce the amount of research performed within a
specific cost envelope. Given participants’ altruism and minimal
risks, if appropriate governance mechanisms were in place, that
broad forms of consent are permissible is generally accepted
[16-21]. These take several forms:
• Simple broad consent with the possibility of withdrawal at
a later date: this suffers the disadvantage that the participant
may not be kept aware of further projects to be able to
exercise the right to withdraw consent
• Categorical consent: this is narrower—consenting to
research in particular areas, which would be compliant with
GDPR
• Consent to a form of governance: regulation of the resource
can be entrusted to a reflexive governance mechanism that
participants trust to make surrogate decisions informed by
input of both shareholders and stakeholders [14,22]
• Combinations of these options or some other variation
[23,24]
Alternatively, dynamic consent may be required. In this
situation, participants are provided with information about each
research project to decide whether to provide consent [25]. This
mandates specific informed consent for each project, but it has
been shown that participants can find this process too demanding
[22,26-28].
When research is performed using “found data,” the issue of
obtaining even broad consent is more problematic [29]. These
considerations mean that with appropriate approval, participants’
informed consent may not be necessary, contrary to established
practice in biomedical research [10,30]. There are broad research
exemptions for data science, but derogations to permit research
using sensitive data are narrower. GDPR states that research on
sensitive data must be “in the public interest” (Recital 53).
There is the potential for several bodies to be involved with
decision making on consent to use health care data for
research—research ethics committees or institutional review
boards, data access committees, data protection authorities, and
health service management boards. Some of these bodies have
local, national, and supranational arms, each of which may have
a different perspective and make different decisions based on
the same facts. There are anecdotal reports of divergent opinions
on consent to data use between research ethics committees and
the Confidentiality Advisory Group of the UK’s Health Research
Authority (Personal communication from John Fistein).
Although the Confidentiality Advisory Group’s main remit is
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to advise the Health Research Authority and Secretary of Health
pursuant to the Health Service (Control of Patient Information)
Regulations 2002 and s251 of the Health and Social Care Act
2012, its assessments include an implicit ethical evaluation of
whether confidential patient information can be processed.
Similar inconsistencies and tendencies toward risk aversion
have been described in relation to administrative data [5].
Potential harms that participants in data research might be
exposed were examined in a scoping study conducted at the
Mason Institute and Farr CIPHER for the Nuffield Council on
Bioethics Working Party on Biological and Health Data and by
the Wellcome Trust’s Expert Advisory Group on Data Access
[31]. Limited owing to time and resource constraints, their study
focused on the instances of financial damage and emotional
distress to individuals. There may be substantial harm to
organizations as well, including reputational damage and loss
of trust. Many incidents they identified were related to
maladministration, and this reinforces the need for secure
systems for data science.
Difficulties with consent illustrate that merely gaining consent
is not a panacea for all data research issues even when
practicable. The standard paradigm for data research is to
“consent or anonymize.” Therefore, if consent is not practicable
for big data projects, the researcher might choose to anonymize
data. This is not necessarily straightforward and introduces a
host of other issues.
Anonymization
Anonymization is a means of preventing a breach of
confidentiality and preserving privacy. Anonymized data are
not protected under data protection law. Confidentiality and
privacy are related concepts: confidentiality is a duty owed,
often by a professional, to an individual in particular
circumstances; privacy is a right that a person enjoys. An
individual divulges many sensitive facts to professionals,
particularly in law and medicine [32], with the understanding
that the professional has a professional, legal, and ethical duty
to maintain the information and data in confidence or face hefty
sanctions for breaching these duties [33-35]. Duty of
confidentiality does not apply where data have been
anonymized. A duty of confidentiality is included in the
Hippocratic Oath [36] and the Geneva Declaration [37], but
there is an additional duty in the Geneva Declaration which is
to: “share my medical knowledge for the benefit of the patient
and the advancement of healthcare.”
This injunction could be interpreted as placing a duty on
physicians to share data for purposes of medical research when
conducted for the common good. In the UK, the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and the Caldicott Review have
commented on the problem of not using data [38,39]. Caldicott
made this an added seventh principle: “The duty to share
information can be as important as the duty to protect patient
confidentiality.” Although this added principle is in the context
of particular duties to an individual, rather than research per se,
it could be interpreted to include a duty to use data to improve
health care.
The distinction between privacy and confidentiality is
acknowledged in data protection law in which particular
protections apply to those “who in the circumstances owe a duty
of confidentiality which is equivalent to that which would arise
if that person were a health professional” (UK Data Protection
Act 1998; similar provisions apply in other transpositions of
the Data Protection Directive). Data safe havens require
researchers’ contractual duty to maintain confidentiality and
not to attempt reidentification [40,41]. Hefty sanctions should
be applied only to those intentionally breaching guidelines;
otherwise, a tendency will arise to restrict data sharing
unnecessarily [31]. This is one factor behind the tendency of
not sharing data when doing so is both legally and ethically
acceptable [5].
Anonymization is the procedure that removes data from the
remit of data protection law, which pertains only to personal
data. Data about or relating to a person are no longer personal
if these cannot be linked to the person. Anonymization requires
more than just removal of identifiers; the combination of 3
pieces of data could identify 87% of US residents—5-digit zip
code, birth date, and sex (note that this would not satisfy the
HIPAA Privacy Rules anonymization criteria for 2 of the 3
fields, see Multimedia Appendix 1) [42].
GDPR defines personal data as relating to “an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’),” as included in
Article 4.1. The definition of “an identifiable natural person”
covers identification by direct or indirect means and can range
from a name to social identity. The nature of personal data is
not further defined. Although some facts about an individual
are trivial, nonetheless, defining content of personal data that
would cover all individuals in all situations and be universally
acceptable is difficult. The UK Anonymisation Network
(UKAN), run by a consortium of the University of Manchester,
University of Southampton, the Open Data Institute, and the
Office for National Statistics to establish best practice for
anonymization, has classified data, as shown in Table 1.
Defining personal data purely by content is problematic, perhaps
because some data tangentially refers to a person, for example,
a vehicle registration plate (which would be secondary personal
data under the UKAN schema), or because whether the data
identifies someone depends on many other factors. This issue
is illustrated vividly by the decision in Breyer v Germany on
whether a dynamic internet provider address is personal data.
UKAN states that anonymization depends not only on data but
also on the environment within which that data are found [43].
Table 1. Four types of data depending on whether they are about people and whether they are identifiable [43]. Source: Anonymisation Decision-Making
Framework.
Identifiable dataNonidentifiable dataAbout individuals
Primary personal dataAnonymized dataYes
Secondary personal dataApersonal dataNo
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UKAN has divided anonymization into the following 4 types:
formal, guaranteed, statistical, and functional [43]. First, formal
anonymization means that direct identifiers have been removed.
This does not satisfy the EU legal standard. Second, guaranteed
or absolute anonymization, as the name suggests, provides
security against any possible reidentification but often at the
expense of the removal of large amounts of data. Data protection
law does not require this but individual data controllers may
deem it necessary. Third, statistical anonymization is tied to the
concept of statistical disclosure control. It seeks to reduce the
chance of reidentification to below a given predetermined
statistical threshold. This threshold is crucial to whether
anonymization provides real protection; for example, with
differential privacy, the epsilon value selected by Apple has
been severely criticized for providing little protection of privacy
[44]. Finally, functional anonymization examines the risk of
anonymization within a particular context, taking into account
motivations of an attacker, consequences of disclosure, and data
divergence among other criteria. Data protection legislation
does not consider these factors in legal standards for
anonymization.
Difficulties With Anonymization
In light of difficulties in defining and ensuring anonymity,
definitions of personal data across the globe are becoming
broader [45-48]. Proliferation of data collected by various data
controllers about data subjects and evolution of techniques to
reidentify data subjects has required reassessment of
anonymization. Now, unless data are substantially masked,
swapped, grouped, or deleted, an individual can often be
identified by someone sufficiently determined, with the right
technical skills, and with sufficient additional data [42,49].
Although methods have been developed to achieve tailored
levels of processing to maximize data’s utility, while ensuring
anonymization to a given level, none of these alter the fact that
making good use of data and achieving rigorous anonymization
are currently incompatible. Statutes do not mandate guaranteed
anonymization. Instead, they set a standard of difficulty of
reidentification that must be achieved. This depends on factors
such as motivations and skills of an intruder and information
that might be combined with data. None of the legal standards
appear to vary according to data’s circumstances or sensitivity,
although these factors feed into an assessment of good practice
[50,51] and could be incorporated into codes of conduct that
would be part of the regulatory milieu encouraged by GDPR
Article 40 (Comments made at the Privacy Engineering Research
and the GDPR Workshop, KU Leuven November 10, 2017 as
observed by JR).
Sensitive personal data are defined in data protection legislation,
and health care data are one of those categories (s2, Data
Protection Act 1998, UK). There are additional ethical and legal
protections for health care data, which may include specific
protections for particular categories, for example, sexually
transmitted infections (eg, National Health Service, Venereal
Diseases, Regulations SI 1974/29-UK, now repealed) and
genetic data (eg, S.I. No. 687/2007—Data Protection Processing
of Genetic Data Regulations 2007, Ireland; outside the EU, there
is the Federal Act on Human Genetic Analysis 2004,
Switzerland). It has been demonstrated that public conception
of sensitive data categories may vary from that defined in
legislation [52,53].
Anonymization introduces several problems for data researchers,
particularly in health care research. It reduces the quantity and
quality of usable data to a variable degree. Anonymization
makes it impossible to verify data or act on any results that
might have consequences for participants, for example, when
imaging studies are performed. It will prevent linking of records,
either to form a longitudinal health record or to link datasets on
relevant issues such as socioeconomic indicators.
Pseudonymization makes several of these objectives possible;
however, in GDPR, pseudonymization is specifically excluded
from being categorized as anonymization.
Public Attitudes Toward Data Science
The basis of an ethical waiver for consent largely rests on the
presumption that the public would consent to having their data
used in this way, given the potential for creating public good.
This necessitates an assessment of public attitudes. Different
projects and datasets may require different approaches for
preserving participants’ privacy, while maximizing the benefit
of research performed. Another consideration is the public’s
attitude toward data research, in particular, factors that affect
the public’s expectation of how their data will be processed.
This is especially important because the social license on which
data research with consent or anonymization relies rests on
public support.
The public’s attitudes toward use of data for research have been
studied by the Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP)
and the Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute on behalf of
several UK organizations [23,54-58]. Use of deliberative
engagement methods has proven crucial because public attitudes
to data sharing are affected significantly by provision of
sufficient information on how data are used. During their
deliberative engagement exercise, SHIP found that initially,
members of the public expected consent to be asked for each
research project. However, with greater understanding of the
number of potential research projects with similarity of issues,
they considered broad consent to be as acceptable, if not
preferable. A similar result was found in a study of the US public
[26]. In recent years, the Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute
has conducted studies on behalf of the Medical Research Council
(the use of personal health information in medical research,
2007) [23]; the Economic and Social Research Council
(Dialogue on Data) [58]; the Wellcome Trust (Commercial
access to health data, 2016) [56]; the Royal Statistical Society
(Public attitudes to the use and sharing of their data, 2014 [55]);
and the Government Data Science Partnership (Public dialogue
on the ethics of data science, 2016) [57]. Similar to SHIP, it
found that attitudes to data sharing varied considerably
depending on the purposes and likelihood of public benefit.
Nissenbaum coined the term “contextual integrity” to denote
the binding of data sharing practices to particular contexts [59]:
The mere fact that data are in the public domain does not
constitute license to disseminate them more widely. Solove also
dealt with this issue in his taxonomy of privacy [60]. As the
example of Nader v General Motors Corp. demonstrates,
intrusive monitoring of activities performed in public can be an
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invasion of privacy; just because Nader was in a bank did not
permit anyone to know how much money he was withdrawing
(nor, indeed, that he was there to withdraw money at all).
Therefore, posting material on social media does not
automatically make their use for research ethical. Anonymization
may still be necessary and appropriate for Facebook and Twitter
posts because posters had not intended their material to be
disseminated to a wider audience.
With research on attitudes toward sharing location data in
particular, Sadeh has also found that privacy is highly contextual
[62-64]. Willingness to share location data depends on several
factors including time of day, day of the week, social group
requesting data, and location. Sadeh found that the purpose for
which data would be used was particularly important in decision
making. If location data are crucial to the central purpose, its
use is much more frequently acceptable than when it is tangential
or unrelated to the app’s central purpose. Similarly, an individual
who may be willing to share sensitive data, such as in health
care, might be unwilling to have socioeconomic data linked
with those medical records [65]. This points to a demand for
improved, granular consent requirements to reflect the need for
data from individuals.
Discussion
A Framework for Information Governance: A
Proposed Solution
Governance is an inclusive form of regulation that encompasses
governmental laws and regulations. Information governance
frameworks require synthesis of data protection laws, guidance
from national data protection officers, and an appreciation of
expectations of the public they serve. Governance mechanisms
can and ought to be more flexible and responsive than
governmental laws and regulations. The main justification for
the proposed matrix is all the evidence that supports the common
sense notion that people are willing to share different amounts
and types of data with different people, in different settings, for
different purposes, at different times. Therefore, it is reasonable
to conclude that using the same anonymization standard for all
data protection and freedom of information purposes does not
reflect societal attitudes to data or provide a governance
framework that satisfies individuals’ reasonable expectations.
A proportionate form of governance is preferable to protect
individuals as fully as practicable while maintaining the capacity
to generate useful insights from data [66,67]. The demands of
good governance are usually greater than the legal standard,
and this is particularly true for research in which standards are
left for the scientific community to decide (eg, GDPR allows
consent “in keeping with recognized ethical standards for
scientific research,” Recital 33) [8]. However, there is no
suggestion that this assessment can be done without public
engagement.
The trust placed in medical practitioners and academic
researchers therefore entails the public’s possible acceptance
of a lower standard of anonymization, given that data users have
a professional or contractual duty to respect confidentiality
[35,36]. There is a persuasive case for having different standards
of anonymization for medical research conducted in safe havens
or at least by researchers under a duty (whether professional or
contractual) of confidentiality, including a duty of not attempting
reidentification, and for data released to the public whether
under a freedom of information request or not. The UK Data
Protection Act allows processing of medical data under Schedule
3, Para 8.1b by “a person who in the circumstances owes a duty
of confidentiality which is equivalent to that which would arise
if that person were a health professional.” The trustworthiness
and motives of those who examine data are highly relevant to
which precautions would be prudent. There is no control over
what techniques can be used and by whom once data are released
to the public and are therefore “in the wild.”
Data protection authorities have commented on the dynamic
nature of personal data. The UK ICO (2012) noted that
predictions about data available now or later cannot be made
with certainty (page18) [39]. The EU’s Article 29 Working
Party reached a similar conclusion, recognizing that the changing
nature of data and its usage as well as growth in information
that could aid identification can give rise to new data protection
issues. This requires an appreciation that anonymization is not
a one-off exercise [68]. Data that at one point in time is
anonymized may subsequently be identifiable and thus become
personal data once more. Based on these considerations and the
fact that once data has been released to the public, we conclude
that it cannot be recalled and operations performed cannot be
limited in any way; there is justification for applying the most
stringent standards of anonymization to data for public release.
This distinction was not considered by the UK ICO in their
decision FS50565190 against Queen Mary University of
London, relating to a trial of treatment for chronic fatigue
syndrome. Their decision held that the University could not
withhold data anonymized to the Information Commissioner’s
satisfaction, despite concerns about activists trying to reidentify
participants. The ICO wanted a specific explanation as to how
reidentification would be achieved [69]. Section 22A of the
Freedom of Information Act now exempts research studies from
disclosure prior to publication of papers, but this only extends
the timeframe for disclosure rather than absolutely exempting
them. The University argued that participants had an expectation
that their data would be confidential and that, in a small
community, addition of information, for example, about hospital
appointments, might enable reidentification. Participants had
already withdrawn consent because of such fears, and this
required expensive, time-consuming reanalysis of the remaining
data.
In summary, we argue that the evidence demonstrates that
neither consent nor anonymization to current legal standards is
a solution to all data research issues. Limitations of
anonymization make the application of the same standard across
the board problematic. Recognition of the current framework’s
inadequacy has led us to propose an anonymization matrix for
treatment of sensitive data, particularly health care data. Our
hypothesis is that the matrix will improve proportionate
information governance and can therefore improve the
trustworthiness and utility of data research. This hypothesis
requires testing with empirical research, which is beyond the
remit of this paper.
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Proposal
An Anonymization Matrix
A tool for research ethics committees, institutional review
boards, and data access committees for assessing data protection
aspects of a project and achieve consistent proportionate
information governance is proposed. This P-R matrix (Table 2)
includes a number of levels of anonymization adjusted according
to the best evidence about public attitudes to trustworthiness,
particularly recent research on public attitudes about data’s use
for research. The matrix also takes into account the
unpredictability of health care data’s future identifiability,
holding that any data for public release should be subject to the
highest standards of anonymization in accordance with the
precautionary principle. GDPR and ethical standards demand
that when research is not in the public interest, the standard
paradigm of “consent or anonymize” should apply.
Levels 1-3 of anonymization referenced in the table are defined
in Multimedia Appendix 2. They are developments of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule (detailed in Multimedia Appendix 1) with
the addition of algorithm-based methods that can adjust
processing according to required levels of k-anonymity,
l-diversity, t-closeness, and differential privacy. Definitions of
particular categories and rationales are provided below. We
have also incorporated a UK adaptation for the obscuration of
postcodes in Multimedia Appendix 3.
Considering that particular contexts may make an individual
more vulnerable or the attempts to breach more skilled or more
determined is also appropriate. These special circumstances
include data on celebrities or other persons about whom a
considerable amount of information is already in the public
domain and is widely known. Use of metrics to determine the
possibility of reidentification is appropriate, although the Level
3 standard combined with anonymization algorithms to provide
k-anonymization may not be sufficient to allow for public
release. Synthetic data, or a dataset that has been subtly altered
from the original, is a good substitute in many situations because
it can be demonstrated to provide results very similar to those
obtained from data on which it is based [70,71]. The content of
the columns and rows in Table 2 is explained further.
Rationale for the Anonymization Matrix
Authorization means that data use has been permitted without
consent by a statutory body, research ethics committee, or other
empowered governance body. “Duty of confidentiality” in this
instance means a professional or contractual duty of
confidentiality equivalent to those of health care professionals,
additional to a duty of not attempting reidentification.
Research in Safe Havens
Several requirements must be met for a data safe haven to be
accredited (Textbox 1).
Table 2. P-R anonymization matrix.
Special circumstances
without consent
Very sensitive health care
datab use without consent
Health care data use
without consent
Data use authorized
without consenta
Context of data
Level 2Level 1Level 1Anonymization not
required
Research in safe havensc
Level 3Level 2Level 1Anonymization not
required
Research to which duty of confidentiality applies
Level 3Level 2 + algorithmic ma-
nipulation
Level 1 + algorithmic
manipulation
Level 1 + algorithmic
manipulatione
Research to which no duty of confidentiality
appliesd
Level 3 or synthetic
data or no release
Level 3 or synthetic dataLevel 3 or synthetic
data
Level 3 or synthetic
data or no release
Information for public releasef
aWhere authorization for data processing without consent has been provided by a specific statutory body, a body that provides appropriate safeguards,
or the equivalent for research ethics. These bodies have powers to authorize data use without anonymization; however, good practice requires data
minimization with justification for inclusion of all identifying data.
bVery sensitive data are not exhaustively defined in this paper because they depend heavily on particular sociocultural sensitivities; for example, alcoholic
liver disease would be a sensitive diagnosis in some cultures but not necessarily in all. Sexually transmitted infections are usually considered very
sensitive. Public consultation is needed on use of health care data in an ongoing process.
cRequirements for accreditation include that researchers are under contractual duties of confidentiality, including not to attempt reidentification [40].
dIt should be noted that the UK government has signaled an intention to create a new criminal offense of reidentification [72]; other jurisdictions,
including New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, are also considering this [73,74]. Currently, reidentification would be merely a breach of data protection
law.
eAlgorithmic manipulation means data masking, clustering, or deletion to satisfy demands of k-anonymity and other metrics such as l-diversity, t-closeness,
or differential privacy.
fAs noted above, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office could compel release under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 of data only anonymized
to their standard (currently, the motivated intruder). This standard is arguably deficient for public release of health data [61], and we propose statutory
change to enable an appropriate level of privacy protection to be required.
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Textbox 1. INSERT CAPTION.
(1) Authorization by the appropriate body covers the use of data for research without any anonymization, whether in a data safe haven, when the
researcher is bound by a duty of confidentiality in the same way as medical professionals.
(2) and (3) Anonymization is required to meet legal requirements where authorization has not been granted. Because research is being conducted in
safe havens, there is no requirement for a standard higher than Level 1.
(4) Where there are special circumstances, it seems reasonable to expect a higher standard of anonymization because reidentification could occur
spontaneously without any deliberate attempt by the researcher.
Research Where Duty of Confidentiality Applies
Duty of confidentiality provides protections for participants but
not other safeguards provided in accredited data safe havens.
Hence, some additional anonymization may be necessary.
1. Where authorization is granted, there is no need for
anonymization.
2. Where no authorization has been granted, Level 1
anonymization will satisfy legal and ethical requirements.
3. Where data are particularly sensitive, risks related to
disclosure are correspondingly higher. Therefore, we
recommend Level 2 anonymization.
4. Where there are special circumstances, Level 3
anonymization reduces risk of inadvertent reidentification.
Research in Which No Duty of Confidentiality Applies
If researchers are not under a duty of confidentiality, safeguards
to prevent reidentification should be stronger. Excessive
processing of data can be reduced by resorting to algorithmic
manipulation.
1. Although there is no legal requirement when authorization
has been granted for any anonymization to be performed,
we argue that where there is no duty of confidentiality,
ethical bodies should require it. Additionally, algorithmic
manipulation should be required to ensure that
reidentification cannot occur.
2. Here anonymization is legally required. The safeguard of
additional algorithmic manipulation should be required by
ethical bodies.
3. Processing of more sensitive health care data warrants the
higher level of anonymization with algorithmic
manipulation.
4. Research on data in special circumstances where researchers
are not bound by a duty of confidentiality is worthy of the
highest levels of anonymization (where such research is
permitted at all).
Public Release
When information is released to the public, anonymization must
be as rigorous as possible, owing to future development of new
techniques for reidentification and possible release of further
information. For this reason, we recommend that at least Level
3 anonymization be used. Synthetic data are preferable when
substitution is feasible (Textbox 2).
These requirements would need periodic review. Because data
for public release cannot be modified to increase protection
from reidentification, standards for anonymization must be
robust enough to provide protection for at least the medium
term. The proposed matrix provides guidance for research ethics
review bodies to harmonize their ethical assessments with data
protection requirements, while providing the enhanced
protection expected for sensitive data.
Techniques of Anonymization
It has been said many times that “ought” implies “can” [75].
Anonymization is not an all or nothing process, but rather a
spectrum of processing that provides greater or lesser degrees
of difficulty in reidentifying an individual. Although finite risk
is associated with nearly all data science research, the public is
willing to accept this if mitigated by appropriate data security
and safeguards [76,55]. A further solution to the problem of
reidentification is to restrict access to researchers who have
given assurances that they will not attempt reidentification.
Although potentially attractive and reassuring to the public, this
currently makes no difference to whether data are classified as
indirectly identifiable. However, such assurances would be good
evidence of the provision of appropriate safeguards by the body
concerned.
Techniques involved in anonymization reduce utility of data to
a greater or lesser extent [51,77,78]. Academic literature has
much debated risks associated with anonymized data. Although
researchers have demonstrated that datasets can be reidentified
in defined circumstances, whether these scenarios reflect what
is likely in the real world is contentious [42,49,79].
The 2 approaches to anonymization are rule based and risk
based. Rule-based anonymization is typified by the first part of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which mandates obscuring particular
data fields. The HIPAA Privacy Rule is easy to apply, but there
are problems with it. In some circumstances, it involves
unnecessary deletion of data; in others, it fails to provide
adequate protection from reidentification [80]. Ruling out
unusual data that can uniquely identify an individual is difficult,
an example being the mayor of Ottawa [81]. There is also the
issue of where sufficient data are available in the public domain
about an individual for reidentification to be feasible [61].
Textbox 2. INSERT TITLE.
(1) and (4) Without consent or with special circumstances, there is a case for not releasing any data to the public. Synthetic data pose no privacy risk.
(2) and (3) Release of rigorously anonymized data are acceptable although synthetic data are preferable.
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Risk-based anonymization involves processing guided by the
calculation of the risk of disclosure and assessing which data
need to be obscured to achieve this [50]. It would include the
statistical expertise-based standard in the HIPAA Privacy Rule
and involves such techniques as k-anonymization, l-diversity,
t-closeness, and differential privacy [82-85]. These techniques
examine data for patterns that would enable reidentification (if,
eg, one dataset has particular attributes) and selective data
masking, clustering, or deletion to reduce the possibility of
drawing inferences from deidentified data. These techniques
reduce deterioration in data, but they do not eliminate it. If too
large a value for epsilon is selected for differential privacy, then
privacy protection will be minimal [44]. An overstringent
rule-based approach to anonymization is problematic, and a
proportionate form of governance has distinct advantages
[15,86]. If researchers agree to not attempt reidentifying
participants and their duty is reinforced by the prospect of
sanctions, it provides reassurance and facilitates preservation
of intact data. Conversely, data for public release may be subject
to any number of techniques and addition of data from a variety
of sources, both legal and illegal [61,87].
Advances that have enabled reidentification also enable other
inferences from existing data. This is, after all, the basis for
linkage research. One of the most famous examples is the Target
customer being sent offers on baby-related items when she had
not yet told her father of her pregnancy. The supermarket had
inferred the fact of her pregnancy from her purchasing habits
[88]. The participant cannot have given permission for the
production or storage of these new facts when consent has not
been specifically given for research purposes. Recently, ICO
fined charities for conducting “wealth screening” of potential
donors [89].
Conclusions
The literature on privacy and attitudes toward use of data for
research purposes provides support for application of different
standards of anonymization depending on circumstances.
Additionally, the regulatory burden can be reduced by
harmonization of criteria applied by research ethics committees
and other governance bodies. For research ethics and data access
committees, our anonymization matrix provides guidance that
exceeds the requirements of current data protection laws. Each
row and column of the matrix corresponds to a meaningful
ethico-legal distinction. It offers contextual guidance for research
ethics bodies to recommend appropriate levels of anonymization
when gaining specific consent is not feasible.
We propose that research ethics bodies should not deny
permission on grounds of privacy or consent issues for projects
that satisfy these anonymization requirements. Satisfying these
requirements should make approval, for example, by the
Confidentiality Advisory Group easier. Additionally, compliance
with standards that exceed legal requirements help secure the
social license and thus ensure data bank projects’ legitimacy
and longevity.
The major potential advantage of such a matrix is the facilitation
of international projects. Any ethico-legal framework that
satisfies the requirements of multiple jurisdictions without
imposing excessive regulatory burden will be a valuable tool
for such projects. To demonstrate the matrix’s value for
improving research ethics committees’ decision making on
information governance, we propose its use in EU data science
projects on a trial basis.
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